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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890296-CA 
v, : 
CHARLES LOUIS KINSEY, : Priority Two 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
B R I E F O F R E S P O N D E N T 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of retail theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
602(1) (Supp. 1987); aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978); and of carrying 
a concealed weapon, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1987), following a jury trial in 
Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable David S. Young, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction in this case under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) 
(Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
excluding the testimony of defendant's witness regarding the 
reliability of eyewitness identification. 
2. Whether defendant was properly convicted of retail 
theft, aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon or 
whether the convictions are duplicative because he engaged in 
only a single act, and whether the punishment for the retail 
theft conviction is constitutionally disproportionate. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1987): 
A person commits the offense of retail theft 
when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries 
away, transfers or causes to be carried away 
or transferred, any merchandise displayed, 
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention 
of retaining such merchandise or with the 
intention of depriving the merchant 
permanently of the possession, use or benefit 
of such merchandise without paying the retail 
value of such merchandise . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (Supp. 1987) 
(amended 1989): 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if 
the: 
(i) value of the property or 
services exceed $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm 
or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly 
weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the 
person of another . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978) (amended 
1989): 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if 
he commits assault as defined in Section 76-
5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious 
bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a deadly weapon or other 
means or force likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree 
felony. 
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Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-504 (Supp. 1987): 
(1) Any person, except those persons 
described in Section 76-10-503 and those 
persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, 
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, as 
defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor, except that a firearm that 
contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a 
case, gun box, or securely-tied package shall 
not be considered a concealed weapon, but: 
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a 
firearm and contains no ammunition, he 
shall be guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor; 
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a 
firearm and contains ammunition, he 
shall be guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; or 
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-
off shotgun, or if the dangerous weapon 
is a firearm and is used to commit a 
crime of violence, he shall be guilty 
of a felony of the third degree. 
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent 
any person, except persons described in 
Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his 
place of residence, place of business, or any 
vehicle under his control any firearm, except 
that it shall be a class B misdemeanor to 
carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978): 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under 
any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish 
separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to 
promote justice, a defendant shall not be 
subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
n 
(a) The offenses are within the 
jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense 
is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitations, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged 
or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after 
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that 
there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that 
there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for a conviction for that included 
offense, the verdict or judgment of 
conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the 
included offense, without necessity of a new 
trial, if such relief is sought by the 
defendant. 
United States Const, amend VIII: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted,. 
Utah Const, art. I, S 9s 
Excessive bail shall not be required; 
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor 
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shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned 
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Charles Louis Kinsey, was convicted 
following a jury trial on March 7 and 8, 1989, of retail theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
602(1) (Supp. 1987) (a second degree felony based upon Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1987)); aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of 76-5-103 (1978) (amended 
1989); and carrying a concealed weapon, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1987). He was 
sentenced on April 7, 1989, to one to fifteen years for the 
retail theft conviction, to up to five years for the aggravated 
assault conviction, and to up to six months for the carrying 
concealed weapon conviction. The sentences were ordered to run 
concurrently. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 9, 1987, Wayne Dial, a Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Deputy, was working as a security guard at Sears at 
Fashion Place Mall (T. 3, 13). At approximately 11:30 a.m., 
Deputy Dial was observing the sales floor of the store through a 
closed circuit television system (T. 14). He observed, and 
recorded on videotape, defendant walking through the store 
carrying electrical items (T. 16). Defendant entered the men's 
restroom; when he exited, he no longer had the electrical items 
in his hand (T. 16). Deputy Dial notified another security 
guard, Tim Maddox, who is also a police officer, that there was a 
possible theft in progress, and that the suspect was leaving the 
store (T. 16, 70, 75). Deputy Dial left the video monitor area 
in pursuit of defendant (T. 17-18). He saw defendant walk out of 
the store (T. 19). He confronted defendant and identified 
himself as a security agent for Sears as he displayed his 
identification (T. 19-20). He told defendant he wanted to talk 
with him about the items he took from the store (T. 20). 
Defendant brought up his left arm and Deputy Dial grabbed it with 
his right hand (T. 20). Officer Kaddox exited the building and 
joined Deputy Dial (T. 21, 75). Defendant unbuttoned a couple of 
buttons on his green military-type shirt, reached inside, and 
handed Deputy Dial two electrical items packaged in Sears 
containers (T. 20). When Deputy Dial began a pat-down search, he 
asked defendant if he had any weapons (T. 20-21). Defendant then 
broke away from Deputy Dial and pulled a large caliber handgun, 
which had been concealed in a holster underneath the right side 
of his jacket (T. 21, 76). Defendant held the gun in a combat 
position and pointed it back and forth at Dial and Maddox for a 
period of from three to five seconds (T\ 22, 23, 78). Defendant 
then ran into the mall and escaped (T. 24). 
Deputy Dial and Officer Maddox both testified that the 
day of the incident was bright and sunny, and that they were not 
fatigued or otherwise impaired when they observed defendant (T. 
25, 80, 81). Deputy Dial was looking at defendant's face during 
the entire incident in order to remember his face for later 
identification (T. 34, 45). He closely observed defendant's 
facial characteristics, size, and dress, and gave a detailed, 
accurate description of his observations (T. 20, 34-36, 38, 59, 
61, 64). 
Deputy Dial made extensive efforts to locate defendant 
after the crime, including going through the files of those 
licensed to carry concealed weapons at the Department of Public 
Safety and showing the videotape to numerous law enforcement 
officers (T. 35-36). He and Officer Maddox reviewed the videotape 
several times (T. 36, 86). 
On September 26, 1988, Deputy Dial was beginning his 
shift as a security guard at Harmon's grocery store (T. 37). He 
saw defendant at the store and immediately recognized him (T. 38). 
Defendant stopped short for about five seconds when he saw Deputy 
Dial (T. 38). He was subsequently arrested (T. 39). Both 
officers positively identified defendant at the preliminary 
hearing and at trial (T. 39, 81-82). The videotape, which 
depicted defendant at Sears for about fifteen minutes, was shown 
to the jury (T. 41). 
Defendant testified he was not sure what he did on 
December 9, 1987, but denied having gone to Sears or committing 
the theft (T. 147-48, 160). The jury returned a guilty verdict of 
retail theft, aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon 
(T. 164). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Whether to admit the testimony of defendant's witness 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification was within 
the discretion of the trial court and, under the circumstances of 
this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
The defendant was properly convicted of retail theft, 
aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon. His 
convictions for retail theft and carrying a concealed weapon did 
not result from the same act. The sentence imposed for the 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE 
RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
Defendant claims that the cautionary jury instruction 
on the reliability of eyewitness identification approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), 
was inadequate in the present case, and that the trial court did 
not adequately justify the exclusion of defendant's expert 
witness on eyewitness identification. The issue is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in excluding defendant's 
proposed expert witness testimony. 
A. Whether to Allow Expert Testimony is Within the Discretion of 
the Trial Court. 
Defendant has relied on State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986) (limited on other grounds, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 1989)), 
and State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) as support for 
his proposition that the cautionary eyewitness identification 
instruction given in this case was insufficient. In Long, the 
Supreme Court discussed research that has demonstrated the 
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, and required 
trial courts to give a cautionary jury instruction when requested 
by a defendant in cases where eyewitness identification is a 
central issue. In determining the remedy for potential problems 
in eyewitness identification, the Court stated that "[t]he 
approach we adopt today offers a defendant some protection from 
false conviction, while ensuring the efficacy of the jury system 
by providing jurors with the knowledge necessary for sound 
decision making [footnote omitted]." j[d. at 492. Defendant's 
reliance on Rimmasch for the proposition that the Supreme Court 
has taken notice of the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification is misplaced (Appellant's Opening Brief at 1); 
Rimmasch does not address this issue, but rather clarifies the 
standard for the foundational requirements of expert testimony in 
general. 
The question in this case is not whether eyewitness 
identification may be unreliable under some circumstances, but 
whether defendant established that the expert testimony was 
necessary to explain to the jury the issues covered in the Long 
instruction. In Rimmasch, the Supreme Court discussed the 
foundational prerequisites for expert scientific testimony. The 
Court held that in addition to the requirements of Rule 702, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, which requires that the proponent of the 
testimony establish that it will assist the trier of fact 
determine a fact in issue, the proponent must establish the 
inherent reliability of the expert testimony. In order to do so, 
the proponent of the testimony can request that judicial notice 
be taken; however, a very high level of reliability is required 
before the court can take judicial notice. Icl. at 398. 
Alternatively, the proponent can produce evidence to establish 
that the scientific principles are sound. Idi. Further, the 
proponent must establish the qualifications of the expert and 
that the scientific principles have been properly applied to the 
facts of the particular case. Iji. at 398 n. 7. 
In the present case, defendant's proposed witness was 
Ed Barton, the chief investigator at the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association (T. 116). Mr. Barton has received some 
training in the area of eyewitness identification and is familiar 
with the work of Elizabeth Loftus, who has extensively studied 
and written about eyewitness identification (T. 118-19). The 
trial court found that Mr. Barton would qualify as an expert in 
the area (T. 137). However, the defense made no effort to 
establish the inherent reliability of his proposed testimony, 
either by way of requesting judicial notice or by producing 
evidence, and made to effort to establish that the scientific 
principles involved had been properly applied to the facts in the 
case at hand. In fact, Mr. Barton had never seen the videotape 
and had no knowledge of what the two eyewitnesses in the case had 
observed or experienced (T. 129, 135). Mr. Barton acknowledged 
that his testimony would be a "lecture" to the jury on eyewitness 
identification in general (T. 129). 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously ruled on two 
occasions that whether to admit expert testimony on the 
reliability of eyewitness identification is within the discretion 
of the trial court. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 
1982); State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981). In 
Griffin, the Court stated it is "in accord with the cases which 
hold that whether a jury should have a lecture from a 
psychologist as to the credibility of evidence [on eye witness 
identification] is within the discretion of the trial court" and 
that the trial court is "not compelled to allow such testimony." 
Id. at 481. Defendant has not distinguished these cases and has 
cited no authority in opposition to the Utah Supreme Court's 
position. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding the 
Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewitness Identification. 
Defendant claims that the trial court did not 
adequately "justify" its exclusion of the testimony of Ed Barton 
(Appellant's Opening Brief at 2). The proper inquiry is whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the testimony 
inadmissible. State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981). 
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial aright of the party is 
affected . . . . Utah R. Evid. 103(a). The trial court may 
exclude even relevant evidence based upon "considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. An appellate court 
should not interfere with a trial court's determination on the 
admission of evidence unless it clearly appears that the court so 
abused its discretion that there was a likelihood of substantial 
injustice. State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). Even 
trial counsel in the present case acknowledged that the decision 
of whether to admit the testimony was within the trial court's 
discretion and that its decision would be upheld by the appellate 
court (T. 141). 
At the request of the prosecution and the defense (T. 
143), the trial court gave the jury the cautionary instruction 
approved in Long regarding the problems inherent in eye-witness 
identification. (See Appendix A.) The four-page instruction 
addressed all commonly accepted areas of concern. The 
instruction went beyond the frequently used Telfaire instruction 
and was substantively identical to the instruction the Supreme 
Court proposed in Long. The court statcni that if the proposed 
instruction were given, "it would certainly satisfy our expressed 
concerns about the need for cautionary instructions." ^d. at 
495. 
The trial court properly excluded the testimony of Ed 
Barton. The court ruled that the proposed testimony would not be 
beneficial to the jury and would be in exc€>ss of, or cumulative 
to, the "Long" instruction, which had been requested by both 
parties (T. 143). It found that the instruction "provides 
sufficient caution to the jury" (T. 143). The court also noted 
that the videotape in the present case further supported its 
decision. Unlike most other cases involving eyewitness 
identification, the videotape gave the two eyewitnesses an 
opportunity to refresh their recollection. The videotape also 
gave the jury a "comparative reference" that would not usually be 
available in evaluating the evidence (T. 143). 
In addition to the reasons set-forth above, which are 
more than adequate to support its decision, the trial court noted 
additional factors it relied upon in excluding the testimony. 
1
 United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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The trial court noted the factors discussed in State v. 
Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1980), which would provide 
additional safeguards against an improper identification. First, 
the prosecution's decision to prosecute this case shows that the 
State viewed the evidence as reliable; second, the trial court 
could suppress the identification testimony if the identification 
procedures rendered the evidence unreliable; third, the cross-
examination of officers Dial and Maddox were persuasive, 
adequate, careful and competent; fourth, the jury instruction, 
which was the instruction recommended in Long, was adequate to 
inform the jury of the issues; fifth, the requirement of 
unanimity of the jury is an additional safeguard, and, finally, 
the trial court has the power to grant relief if it were 
convinced that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict 
(T. 143-44). As defendant points out (Appellant's Opening Brief 
at 4-5), each factor considered individually may be problematic, 
but when considered together, along with the additional factors 
present here, the trial court properly determined that the 
evidence should be excluded. 
Defendant claims that this was "a very close case" 
(Appellant's Opening Brief at 5). On the contrary, the evidence 
in this case was very compelling. There was not one, but two 
eyewitnesses who identified defendant. The eyewitnesses were not 
lay people who made observations while not knowing that something 
significant was occurring. Rather the witnesses were trained 
police officers who were working as security agents for Sears at 
the time (T. 3, 70). Deputy Dial, for example, stood just a few 
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feet from defendant as he looked at him squarely in the face (see 
T. 22, 34, 64). Knowing that he would later have to identify 
him, he paid close attention to detail and was able to describe 
with specificity his physical characteristics and clothing (T. 
34-36, 59-64). In addition to the eyewitness testimony, 
defendant was actually videotaped in the course of shoplifting 
the items from Sears (T. 14-16). The officers reviewed the 
videotape to refresh their recollection; the videotape was shown 
to the jury (T. 36, 65. 86). Finally, defendant's unusual style 
of dress at the time of the crime and later arrest, including the 
green army fatigue shirt and black nylon belt with pouches, 
further corroborates the identification (T. 35-36, 38). 
Given the circumstances of this case, including the 
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification given to the 
jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
the testimony of defendant's proposed expert witness. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF, AND 
SENTENCED FOR, RETAIL THEFT AND CARRYING A 
CONCEALED WEAPON. 
Defendant claims that he was improperly convicted of, 
and sentenced for, both retail theft while armed with a deadly 
weapon (a second degree felony) and carrying a concealed dangerous 
weapon (a class B misdemeanor). He argues that the State is 
prohibited from convicting for both crimes by Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-402(1) (1978) which reads: 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant 
-i 4_ 
under a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of 
this code, the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
Defendant's sole argument on this point is that 
"possession of a weapon by the perpetrator is punishable as an 
enhancement to the theft or as a concealed weapon" (Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 6). Presumably, defendant's argument is that his 
convictions for retail theft and carrying a concealed weapon are 
duplicative because they involved "the same act." The Utah 
Supreme Court stated that M[t]he intent of this provision [76-1-
402(1)] is clear. A defendant may not be punished twice for a 
single act." State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1986). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have found that 
where acts that are part of a single criminal episode require 
proof of different elements, they constitute separate offenses. 
O'Brien, 721 P.2d at 900; State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
To establish second degree felony theft in this case, 
the prosecution was required to prove the following elements: 
1. That defendant knowingly 
2. took possession of, etc., merchandise 
displaced in a retail mercantile 
establishment 
3. with the intention of retaining the 
merchandise or depriving the merchant 
permanently of the prosecution 
4. without paging the retail value of the 
merchandise, and 
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5. that the defendant was armed with a^ 
deadly weapon at the time of the theft. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1987) (amended 1989). The 
crime does not require that the deadly weapon be concealed. 
To establish the crime of carrying a concealed weapon 
as a class B misdemeanor, the prosecution was required to 
establish the following elements: 
1. That defendant carried a concealed 
dangerous weapon. 
Second degree retail theft, as prescmted here, requires 
only that the defendant be armed with a deadly weapon. Carrying 
a concealed dangerous weapon requires that the prosecution prove 
an additional element: concealment of the weapon. Consequently, 
the "same act" of the defendant does not establish both second-
degree felony retail theft under §§ 76-6-602(1) and 76-6-
412(1)(a)(iii) and carrying a concealed weapon under § 76-10-504. 
The crimes are separate offenses, requiring proof of separate 
elements, and defendant was properly convicted of and sentenced 
for both offenses. 
Defendant's final argument is that the punishment 
imposed was disproportionate to the crimes and constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to 
Contrary to defendant's assertion that the deadly weapon 
"enhances" the crime, being armed with a deadly weapon, like 
establishing value, is an element of the offense. See State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980). 
3 
If the deadly weapon is a securely packagedr unloaded firearm, 
its possession is not illegal. Further, if the deadly weapon is 
a firearm and unloaded, the crime is a class B misdemeanor. To 
establish a class A misdemeanor, the prosecution would have to 
prove that the firearm was loaded at the time of the crime. 
the United States Constitution and article 1, section 9 of the 
Utah Constitution. Defendant's reliance on Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277 (1983), is not persuasive. In Solem, defendant was 
given a life sentence without possibility of parole for issuing a 
$100 bad check. 
In State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "[o]nly rarely will a 
statutorily prescribed punishment be so disproportionate to the 
crime that the sentencing statute is unconstitutional." The 
legislature is accorded substantial deference in determining the 
penalty for crimes. Icl. In determining whether the punishment 
is disproportionate, the court must consider the gravity of the 
4 
offense and the harshness of the penalty. Id.. In the present 
case, the gravity of the offenses was extreme. Defendant 
committed retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon, he 
assaulted two security agents by actually pointing a gun at them 
at close range in a threatening manner, and he concealed the 
dangerous weapon in a holster under his jacket. For these crimes 
he received consecutive terms of one to fifteen years, zero to 
five years, and up to six months, respectively. Unlike the 
mandatory life sentence in Solem for a $100 bad check, the 
punishment here was not constitutionally disproportionate. The 
gravity of the crimes justify the harshness of the penalty. 
Although defendant does not argue either of these points, other 
considerations are whether the sentence is disproportionate to 
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction, and sentences for the same crime imposed on 
defendants in other jurisdictions. Bishop, 717 P.2d at 269. 
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Should this Court find that defendant's convictions and 
punishment for retail theft while armed with a firearm and 
possession of a concealed dangerous weapon are the result of the 
same act and are disproportionate, as defendant argues, the 
conviction of the concealed dangerous wcsapon offense should be 
regarded as surplusage and the felony retail theft conviction 
should not be affected. In State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 
1985), the Supreme Court ruled that when a defendant has been 
improperly convicted of both a greater offense and a lesser-
included offense, the conviction of the lesser-included offense 
should be regarded as mere surplusage and the conviction of the 
greater offense would remain in unaffected. 
However, as set forth above, the convictions and 
punishments are neither duplicative nor constitutionally 
disproportionate. It would be the obvious intent of the 
legislature to discourage, and appropriately punish, being armed 
with a deadly weapon in a situation as potentially violative as 
retail theft. It would also be the clear intent of the 
legislature to discourage, and appropriately punish, concealment 
of a weapon. This Court should, therefore, affirm the judgment 
of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Charles Louis Kinsey, was properly 
convicted of retail theft, aggravated assault, and carrying a 
concealed weapon, and his sentence for the convictions was not 
constitutionality disproportionate. For the reasons discussed 
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above, and any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the 
State of Utah requests that this Court affirm the convictions and 
sentence. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTION NO. «3>3 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of 
the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a right to 
take into consideration their bias, their interest in the result of 
the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, 
if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses1 deportment upon 
the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their 
apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity 
to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to 
remember. You should consider these matters together with all of 
the other facts and circumstances which you may believe have a 
bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses1 
statements. 
In judging the weight of the testimony and the credibility 
of eyewitnesses testifying to the identity of the person who 
committed an alleged crime, you are instructed that identification 
testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In 
considering what weight to give to the testimony of an identifying 
eyewitness, you should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to 
observe the criminal actor? 
In answering this question, you may consider: 
a) the length of time the witness observed the 
actor; 
b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
c) the extent to which the actor1 s features were 
visible and undisguised; 
INSTRUCTION NO ^> , Cont'd 
d) the light or lack of light at the place and time 
of observation; 
e) the presence or absence of distracting noises or 
activity during the observation; 
f) any other circumstances affecting the witness1 
opportunity to observe the person committing the 
crime. 
2. Did the witness have the capacity to observe the 
person committing the crime? 
In answering this question, you may consider whether the 
witness* capacity was impaired by: 
a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
c) uncorrected visual defects; 
d) fatigue or injury; 
e) drugs or alcohol. 
You may also consider whether the witness is of a 
different race than the criminal actor. Identification by a person 
of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a 
person of the same race. 
3. Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the 
criminal actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you may consider whether the 
witness knew that a crime was taking place during the time he or 
she observed the actor. Even if the witness had adequate 
opportunity and capacity to observe the criminal actor, he or she 
may not have done so unless he or she was aware that a crime was 
being committed. 
OOO^ '?r* 
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4, Was the witness* identification of the defendant 
completely the product of his or her own memory? 
In answering this question, you may consider: 
a) the length of time that passed between the 
witness1 original observation and his or her 
identification of the defendant; 
b) the witness* mental capacity and state of mind 
at the time of the identification; 
c) the witness* exposure to opinions, descriptions 
or identifications given by other witnesses, to 
photographs or newspaper accounts, or to any 
other information or influence that may have 
affected the independence of his or her 
identification; 
d) any instances when the witness, or any 
eyewitness to the crime, failed to identify the 
defendant; 
e) any instances when the witness, or any 
eyewitness to the crime, gave a description of 
the actor that is inconsistent with the 
defendants appearance; 
f) the circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to the witness for identification. 
5. Was the witness* identification of the defendant 
corroborated by other evidence? 
You may take into account that an identification made by 
picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is 
generally more reliable than an identification made from the 
defendant being presented alone to the witness. 
You may also take into account that identifications made 
from seeing the person are generally more reliable than 
identifications made from a photograph. 
The burden of proving that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime is on the prosecution. If, after considering 
OOG: je 
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all the evidence you have heard from the prosecution and from the 
defense, including evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of 
the considerations listed above, you have a reasonable doubt about 
whether the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you 
must find him not guilty. 
If, on the other hand, you have no such reasonable doubt 
as to his identity and you find all of the other elements of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find him guilty. 
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